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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A Management Problem 
The size and complexity of business enterprises have increased 
tremendously since the beginning of this century. To cope with this situation, 
the science of management has been developed extensively. Huge businesses 
such as Dupont, Sears Roebuck, General Electric, and General Motors have 
given considerable study to the field of management in order to find better ways 
of solving the problems of modern business. As a result of such study, these 
companies have modified much of their earlier thinking on the most effective 
use of management talent. 
In many of these large firms more effective management has been 
achieved by a greater delegation of authority. This delegation is accomplished 
by decentralization. Decentralization is a philosophy of organization and manage­
ment that goes beyond mere delegation of authority. It implies both selective dis­
persal and concentration of authority. Careful selection of what to place at lower 
levels in the organization structure and what to hold at the top, specific policy 
making to guide decision making, selection and training of personnel, and adequate 
1 
controls are all prerequisites to successful decentralization . 
Decentralization of authority is a relative situation. Absolute decen­
tralization or centralization of authority is very unlikely. Absolute centralization 
Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, Principles of Management 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co./ 1964), p. 318. 
2 
could exist, but this would imply no subordinate managers or organization. 
Absolute decentralization could not exist because, if the manager delegates all of 
his authority, he is no longer a manager; there would again be no organization. 
Both decentralization and centralization, then, are degrees of delegation of 
authority. 
The degree of decentralization is affected by many factors, not the least 
of which is the desires of the company's incumbent top management. If these execu­
tives dislike delegating their authority, decentralization will tend to be limited . 
However, there are a number of factors beyond the executives* control which affect 
the degree of decentralization. Two of the most important factors are the size of 
the firm and the desire for independence. 
As the firm grows in size, more and more decisions have to be made. If 
all decisions are referred to top management, a backlog is likely to occur. Slow 
decisions are costly because they result in lost sales or missed opportunities. To 
minimize this cost, the decision level must be as close as possible to the transaction. 
This can be accomplished by decentralization. 
The desire for some degree of independence and a sense of achievement 
is characteristic of individuals. Providing for independence can also be rewarding 
to the company because it tends to encourage initiative and improvement of manage­
ment skills. Well-planned decentralization should allow people to achieve a feel­
ing of independence and participation in the affairs of the company while retain­
ing the efficiencies of centralized coordination and control. 
3 
Profit Centers 
A teehnique that has been used to control decentralized authority is the 
profit center. Profit centers are operating units, divisions or departments,that are 
evaluated primarily in terms of profits earned. Top management delegates to the 
unit manager authority over most of the major determinants of the unit's profits. In 
theory, the unit manager then runs the operating unit as a separate business, subject 
only to policies and guides set down by top management. Joel Dean has suggested 
2 
the following as essential characteristics of a profit center: 
1. Operational independence— Each profit center must be an inde­
pendent operating unit and its manager must have control over 
most, if not all, of the factors affecting profits. This would 
require that he have considerable discretion in determining the 
operating methods, production volume, product mix, and so forth, 
subject only to broad policies and standards set by top manage­
ment. 
2. Access to sources and markets— The profit center manager 
should be free to buy and sell in alternative markets both inside 
and outside the company. 
3. Separable costs and-revenoe A profit center must be able to 
split off its costs and find an-economically realistic price for 
2 
Joel Dean, "Decentralization and Intracompany Pricing," 
Harvard Business Review, XXXIll (July-August, 1955), p. 67. 
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its-end products; otherwise/ measurement of its profit performance 
i? impossible. 
4. Management intent— Only if the basic intent of the operating 
unit is profits should it be treated as a profit center. 
A basic assumption implied in the use of profit centers is that any increase 
in operating unit profits will increase the total company profits by a similar amount. 
The unit manager is encouraged to increase his unit's profits by any means at his 
disposal because his performance is measured, in large part, by these profits. The 
profitability of an operating unit will undoubtedly influence top management in 
allocating funds for capital additions or improvements. Thus, the operating unit's 
profits are used for evaluation and for decision making by both the division mana -
ger and by top management. 
A reliable unit profit computation must be established if the resulting 
profit is to be relied on. Reliable divisional or departmental profit figures are 
difficult to achieve. The primary cause of this difficulty is the fact that the opera­
ting unit is not really independent. Because the operating unit is only semi-inde-
pendent, the problems of pricing goods transferred between operating units (intra-
company transfer pricing) and allocating central office and service unit costs to 
the operating units must be solved. In addition, if a return on investment in unit 
facilities is used, a problem arises in comparing facilities of different ages and 
operations that require different amounts of invested capital. 
When the operating units participate in the processing and sale of the 
same product, intracompany transfer pricing is a significant factor in the 
5 
determination of unit profits. The revenue of the selling unit and the purchase 
costs of the buying unit are directly affected by the price placed on goods trans­
ferred. Determination of a price fair to both units is a must if the divisions or 
departments are to be evaluated as profit centers. 
Allocation of the costs of the service units of the company (central 
office costs, research and development costs, and so forth) is important . These 
expenses as well as those of the operating units must be covered if the company is 
going to be profitable. However, allocation of these costs to the operating units 
tends to be arbitrary. For example, how much of the president's salary should be 
allocated to each unit? Probably the most practical solution to this problem is 
the use of a "stepped" divisional income statement. On a stepped income state­
ment, allocated central office and service costs are deducted at the bottom of the 
3 
statement from divisional profits before deduction of allocated costs. When the 
allocation of costs cannot be determined equitably, the division can be evaluated 
in terms of profits before deduction of allocated costs. 
Form of Organization 
The preceding comments have not indicated the form of organization 
required to implement decentralization. Because decentralization is essentially 
a process of delegation, it is possible to use a variety of organizational structures. 
The most commonly used structures appear to be the corporate division or depart­
ment and the subsidiary. Their popularity is due to the need for a separation 
^See Gordon Shillinglaw, "Guides to Internal Profit Measurement," 
Harvard Business Review, XXXV (March-April, 1957), pp. 82-94. 
6 
of operations to facilitate evaluation. The primary difference between divisions 
or departments and subsidiaries is that the division and the department are a part 
of the parent corporation v/hile the subsidiary is a separate legal entity 
separate corporation. The division and the department differ only in name, 
though the term division seems to imply a larger, more autonomous unit . The 
division appears to be the most popular of the three forms of organizing profit 
4 
centers. 
Decentralization and Profit Centers in Perspective 
The use of profit centers in the framework of a decentralized manage­
ment system appears to be workable if the problems of effective evaluation and 
decision-making are solved. Perhaps some insight into the solution of these prob­
lems can be gained by introducing the philosophy of management used by General 
Motors. 
The General Motors Corporation is a dramatically successful company 
in a competitive and dynamic industry. This success is probably due to a number 
of things, but it seems certain that considerable contribution has been made by 
the company's management philosophy. Decentralization at General Motors 
5 
means decentralized authority with coordinated control by top management. 
4 
See Robert W. Murphy, "Corporate Divisions vs. Subsidiaries," 
Harvard Business Review^, XXXIV (November-December, 1956), pp. 83-92. 
5 
Koontz and O'Donnell, p. 330. 
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Subject to broad corporate policy, each division — such as Chevrolet, Allison, 
and Frigidaire — operates much as an independent business. 
Peter Drucker interviewed a number of the company's executives and 
6 
summarized their views as to the advantages of decentralization as follows: 
1 . Speed and lack of confusion in decision making. 
2, Absence of conflict between top management and the divisions. 
3 . A sense of fairness in dealing with executives, confidence that a job 
well done would be appreciated, and a lack of politics in the 
organization. 
4. Infomiality and democracy in management. 
5 . Absence of a gap between a few top managers and the many subor­
dinate managers in the organization. 
6. The (availability of a large reservoir of promotable managerial man­
power . 
7. Ready visibility of weak managements through results of semi-
independent and often competitive divisions. 
8. An absence of "edit management" and the presence of thorough 
information and consideration of central management decisions. 
How did General Motors solve the problems of evaluating its divisions? 
General Motors' system of evaluation solves these problems by admitting they 
exist. The operating divisions are evaluated in terms of such long-term 
^Koontz and O'Donnell, p. 330, citing P. F. Drucker, Concept of the 
Corporation, (New York: The John Day Company, Inc., 1946). 
8 
considerations as market penetration, personnel training, and product develop­
ment in addition to profits measured by the rate of return earned on invested 
capital. The use of a number of evaluation standards in conjunction with 
knowledge of the effects of such problems as pricing intracompany transfers and 
allocating central office costs results in an analysis which minimizes the effect of 
these evaluation problems. 
The General Electric Company also uses a variety of measurements in 
evaluating its decentralized divisions. In addition to divisional profits, the market 
position, productivity, product leadership, personnel development, employee 
8 
attitudes, and the public responsibility of the divisions are considered significant. 
Evaluations based on a number of factors are less likely to be weakened by the 
deficiencies in measuring any one factor. 
History of Decentralization 
Some of the earliest examples of decentralization are found in the 
holding companies that developed in this country around the turn of the century. 
A holding company is a corporation that acquires control of a number of other 
corporations forming a loose association. The holding company did not carry on 
any operations of its own; it simply controlled its subsidiaries. The holding com­
pany's management of its subsidiaries was decentralized to an extreme in those 
^Alfred P. Sloane, "My Years With General MotorsF o r t u n e ,  
September, 1963, p. 147. 
g 
Ralph J. Cordiner, New Frontiers for Professional Managers 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 100-101. 
9 
cases where no attempt was made to coordinate the activities of the group. 
The deficiencies of this form of organization can be illustrated by the 
troubles experienced by the General Motors Corporation in 1920 and 1921. At 
that time General Motors was a loosely controlled group of automobile and auto­
mobile accessory manufacturers put together by W. C- Durant . The lack of coor­
dination and communication among the various subsidiaries and the parent corpora­
tion almost bankrupted the group during the economic decline of the early 1920s. 
Top management was hampered by the absence of an adequate reporting system to 
9 
apprise them of actions taken by the operating executives. Because of this lack 
of information, no one was aware until it was too late that the company had 
entered the economic decline with excessive inventories and no plans for reducing 
production. The powerful financial influence of the Dupont family prevented the 
collapse of the company. This early experience of Genera! Motors is a good illus­
tration of the importance of adequate control and coordination by top management 
in a decentralized organization. 
Since World War 11^ the rapid increase in the size of business firms has 
increased the pressure for more effective management tools. Many of these large 
firms have selected decentralization as the most promising answer to their manage­
ment problems. A partial list of these businesses includes General Motors, Gener­
al Electric, Sears Roebuck & Company, General Dynamics Corporation^ Standard 
Oil Company of New Jersey, and Armour & Company. 
9 
Alfred P. Sloane, p. 141. 
CHAPTER 11 
AN OVERVIEW OF TRANSFER PRICING METHODS 
Divisional or departmental income figures are somev/hat unreliable as 
standards for evaluation. This weakness in the profit center concept is caused by 
difficulties in determining accurate revenue and expense figures. An example of 
such a difficulty is the pricing of goods transferred within the company. This 
pricing is called intracompany pricing or transfer pricing. 
In this chapter, the basic methods of pricing intracompany transfers 
will be described and discussed briefly. Their application to the problems of 
evaluating a profit center and providing reliable information for decision making 
will be deferred to Chapters III and IV respectively. 
What is a Transfer Price-? 
A transfer price is the net value per unit of goods transferred between 
1 
operating units of the same company. An example would be the price of gaso­
line used to record the transfer of a tankcar of gasoline from the refining division 
to the marketing division of a decentralized oil company. The transfer price used 
to record the "sale" might be full cost, marginal cost, cost plus a fair return, 
market, or a negotiated price . Each of these methods of pricing intracompany 
transfers is currently being used by industry . 
Full Cost 
When cost is used as the transfer price of a product, it usually means 
full cost or standard cost. Full cost would include both the direct costs of 
^Joel Dean, p. 66. 
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producing the transferred goods (materials, labor, and manufacturing overhead) 
and an allocated portion of any selling and administrative costs charged to the 
division by the central office of the company. The full cost price used for trans­
fer pricing might be an estimate based on the historical costs of the prior period. 
On the other hand, it might be a standard cost --a scientifically predetermined 
cost which provides a basis for measuring actual performance. 
The use of either standard or full cost as a transfer price preclydes any 
evaluation of the operating unit as a profit center because transfer prices will 
equal cost. When transfer prices equal cost, there can be no profit for the operat­
ing unit. There are two situations where a cost transfer price may be useful — 
when intracompany transfers are insignificant and when it is not practical to 
evaluate the operating unit as a profit center. 
Intracompany transfers are usually insignificant in a company which is 
decentralized along product lines. This means that each division produces and 
sells a product without any contribution from other divisions. In the few instances 
v/here transfers do occur, cost is the simplest method of accounting for the transfer. 
There are some business activities which are an integral part of the company 
operations that do not lend themselves to profit evaluations. An example might be 
a unit devoted to research and development. Becouse it is not practical to evaluate 
this type of activity in terms of profits, pricing transfers at cost may be appropriate. 
Morton Backer and Lyle E. Jacobsen, Cost Accounting; A Management 
Approach (New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 274. ~~ 
12 
Marginal Cost 
Marginal cost is the additional cost of production resulting from the 
3 
increase in output by one unit. Marginal cost would include only out-of-
pocket costs such as direct labor, material, and any increase in overhead caused 
by the increase in output. Because intracompany transfers priced on a marginal 
cost basis would not cover full costs, the resulting net losses on divisional income 
statements would be meaningless as a basis for evaluating a division's performance. 
Because marginal cost is difficult to determine in actual practice, an 
approximation of marginal cost is often used. This involves calculating the 
variable or direct cost of producing and selling. Variable costs are cosits that 
4 
vary directly with the number of units produced. They differ from mapginal 
costs in that they are an average cost. Thus variable cost is an average^increase 
in production costs per unit increase in production over a given output mange. 
Cost Plus g Fair Return 
Cost plus a fair return differs from a transfer price based solely on cost in 
that an amount is added to cost to provide a profit on the merchandise transferred 
to another division. There are a number of variations of this system of transfer 
pricing . The cost base may be full cost or standard cost. The add-on may range 
from a very nominal amount up to a substantial markup that earns the division an 
impressive return on its investment. 
^Myron H. Umbreit, Elgin F. Hunt, and Charles V- Kinter, Economics. 
(New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1957), p. 293. 
4 
Backer and Jacobsen, p. 118. 
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To illustrate, assume that a plywood manufacturer transfers veneer from 
the veneer division to the panel division at the veneer division's cost plus seven 
per cent. If the unit cost of a given type of veneer is forty cents per foot, the 
transfer price would be 42.8 cents per foot (40'^2.8). The profit to the veneer 
division would be 2.8 cents per foot or seven per cent of the cost of each foot 
sold. Because the divisional profit is determined by the footage sold, volume is 
the only determinant of profits. Profits based on costs are not a satisfactory basis 
for evaluating divisional performance because there is no incentive for the division 
manager to reduqe costs and increase efficiency. All costs incurred will be 
covered by the transfer price. !n fact, the higher the division's costs, the greater 
its profits will be. 
Market 
An intracompany price obtained from published market prices of like or 
similar products is often suggested. A market-based transfer price appears, at 
first, to be an ideal solution to the transfer pricing problem. Divisional profits 
resulting from a market-based transfer price should be a good basis for evdluating 
the division's performance because the transfer price represents the price the divi­
sion would receive if it sold its products outside the company. There are, however, 
a number of problems that arise when market-based transfer prices are used. These 
problems include the following: 
1 . There are a number of products which do not have quoted prices. 
2, The quoted market may not be a real alternative^, i.e., the prod­
ucts in the market are not acceptable to the purchasing division. 
14 
3. The purchasing or selling division may be able to influence the 
quoted price in a small market by entering the market as a buyer 
or a seller. 
4. The quoted market price may be subject to wide fluctuations which 
may make it unacceptable for transfer pricing purposes. 
These problems will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. Their introduction here 
serves to indicate that it is often extremely difficult to determine what market 
really is. The difficulty in determining what a market price might be for a given 
product supports the position that market-based transfer prices are not very 
effective. 
Negotiated Prices 
A negotiated transfer price is a price achieved by arms-length bargain­
ing between the division managers or their delegates. If both parties to the nego­
tiations are well informed as to current market prices^, production costs^ and other 
relevant data, they should be able to agree on a price that is fair to both parties. 
A negotiated price is an attempt to achieve the ideal of having these prices deter­
mined by the forces of supply and demand, i.e., to approximate a real market 
price. The fact that the negotiators are often more limited in their alternatives as 
bargainers than would be the case in a real market situation presents a problem. 
The purchasing division may have no choice but to buy from the selling division, 
and the selling division may be in a similar position. These limitations introduce 
the need for at least some central supervision of negotiated pricing. A^ystem of 
appeal or mediation often satisfies this need by providing a release valve for 
deadlocked negotiations. 
CHAPTER ! 11 
TRANSFER PRICING AND EVALUATION OF PROFIT CENTERS 
Difficulties in Detennining Useful Transfer Prices 
When an operating unit is to be evaluated in terms of profits earned, 
all the factors affecting these profits should be the same as though the division were 
a completely independent company. Transfer prices are often an important det«r-
minant of divisional profits, and we have already observed that these prices are 
not determined in the same manner as prices between separate companies. Separate 
companies would determine prices by arms-length bargaining. Transfer prices are 
not market-determined prices, strictly speaking, and are ordinarily arrived at by 
taking into account 1) cost, 2) cost plus a markup, 3) marginal cost, 4) market, 
or 5) negotiated prices. Discussion of the difficulties of determining a useful 
transfer price follows. 
In the first chapter it was stated that a basic objective of profit center 
decentralization is the delegation of responsibility for earning profits to the divi­
sion managers. Ideally, the evaluation of the division managers would be based 
1 
only on the profits their division earns. Top management would not intervene in 
the internal affairs of the division unless profits are inadequate. Because divisi­
onal profits are affected by the transfer price, the pricing method used is 
important. 
Joel Dean, p. 67. 
16 
Cost 
Evaluation of the division's performance in terms of profits is not possible 
when cost or cost-based transfer prices are used. The reasons for this assertion were 
discussed in Chapter I I. However, a combination of cost and market-based trans­
fer prices has merit. 
Robert McLain has proposed a combination of cost plus a markup and mar-
2 
ket-based prices. He suggests a transfer price computed by adding to cost a mark­
up equal to that charged other companies. This computed price would then be held 
constant even though prices to other companies may fluctuate. Changes in this 
transfer price would be made only when it results in misleading profit evaluations. 
This would probably occur when the transfer price gets too far out of line with 
current market prices. 
Unlike an ordinary cost system, McLain's proposal requires the selling 
division to absorb any changes in its costs. This gives the selling division manager 
incentive to cut costs and improve efficiency. This incentive is lacking in the 
ordinary cost-plus system because the profit is tied to costs. As costs increase, 
profits increase. By holding the transfer price constant, this problem is removed. 
A stable transfer price is another advantage. Unstable or fluctuating 
transfer prices are undesirable because they tend to affect production levels 
When transfer prices fluctuate, the purchasing division may be willing to curtail 
2 
Robert K. McLain, "Transfer Pricing Can Contribute to Divisional 
Performance Evaluation, " National Association of Accountants Bulletin, 
August, 1963, pp. 29-32. 
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production in anticipation of a drop in prices. This reduction in output may 
improve the purchasing division's profits, but at the expense of the selling division. 
When this speculation is carried to the extent of affecting sales, it may actually 
reduce company profits. 
McLain's proposal may be a solution to the transfer pricing problem if 
it is the best method to meet a particular company's objectives. This may occur 
when quoted market prices are unacceptable. Discussion of quoted market 
prices follows . 
Market-based Pricing 
For purposes of evaluating an operating unit in terms of profits, a com­
petitive market price should produce the best results. A competitive market 
exists when a market has many buyers and sellers handling the same product. 
The transactions of any one buyer or seller would not affect the market's price 
level. It is important that the market price be competitive so that neither divi­
sion can affect the transfer price. When intracompany transfers are recorded at 
market, the buying and the selling divisions are in the same position as indepen-
dent companies with regard to pricing of their products. 
Market-based intracompany prices are derived from quoted market 
prices, the published result of current transactions in an existing market. The 
usefulness of market for pricing intracompany transfers is somewhat limited for 
many products. The situations which may limit the use of a market-based 
transfer price are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
18 
Products which have no quoted price 
The first problem is that there are many products for which rro price 
list exists, A product may have no quoted price when only a few firms deal in 
the market or when the product is so unique that the only buyer is the purchasing 
division. An example might be transmissions for John Deere tractors which can 
be used only for assembly or repair of these tractors. 
A market-based transfer price is advantageous because the selling 
division receives the same price it would receive if the goods were sold outside 
the company and the buying division pays the same price it would have to pay to 
purchase the product outside the company. The price is fair to both divisions. 
If no market exists, it may be desirable to estimate a market price so that the 
transfer price will be fair to both divisions. There are two common methods of 
estimating a market price . They are negotiated pricing and asking for bids. 
Because of its importance, negotiated pricing will be discussed in detail in a 
following section of this chapter. 
Asking for bids from outside companies as well as brother divisions Is 
one means of ^timating a market price. To be effective, the outside compani«s 
must have expectations of obtaining at least a portion of the buying division's, 
business. If the outside companies do not expect to receive any orders, they can 
hardly bp expected to take the bidding seriously. If they do not take the bidding 
seriously, these bids may not be what they think the product is worth, and the 
resulting transfer prices would then be somewhat unreliable. This means that even 
when the selling division is consistently the low bidder, some purchases will have 
to be placed with the outside bidders. 
19 
Market is not an alternative 
The second problem involves products that are differentiated. This 
means that while the products are essentially the same,some differentiating char­
acteristics exist. For example, the color, detergent additives and packing of 
motor oils are differentiating characteristics. The marketing division of an oil 
company would not use the motor oil produced by the refining division of a 
another oil company because of specific differences in their motor oils. A 
quoted price for a specific quality of motor oil can be obtained, but this price 
should not be used for pricing intracompany transfers unless the economic value 
of the product differences are excluded from the market price. It would not be 
fair to the selling division to require costly differences not included in the 
market product and then^price the transfer at market. 
An "influenced" market 
When a market is not perfectly competitive, a division may be able to 
influence price levels in the market used to price its intracompany transfers. By 
varying the volume of its transactions in the market, the division can change the 
level of supply or demand. A change in the level of supply or demand will cause 
prices to fluctuate. The ability of one division to manipulate transfer prices and 
thereby improve its profits at the expense of another division is undesirable. 
Profits resulting from manipulation of this sort will distort the evaluation of both 
divisions. 
Unstable markets 
An unstable market price is not a desirable transfer price. In the 
previous discussion of McLain's proposed combination of cost and market-based 
20 
transfer pricing, the undesirable effect of unstable transfer prices was brought 
out. An example would be the pricing of grain transferred from the elevator to 
the milling division of a flour company. Grain prices sometimes fluctuate widely 
and rapidly. The divisional profits may tend to reflect which division is best 
able to take advantage of this fluctuation. The selling division would try to 
make most of its deliveries when prices are high, and the purchasing division 
would try to do most of its buying when prices are low . Simultaneous achieve­
ment of these aims is impossible. The division which gains the upper hand in 
this conflict will tend to show better profits, but these profits will not neces­
sarily indicate an increased contribution to the profits of the firm as a whole. 
When a division's net profits are increased at the expense of another division, 
there is no change in the profits of the firm as a whole. 
Negotiated Pricing 
The use of negotiated pricing to estimate a market price was noted in 
the discussion of market-based transfer pricing. Negotiation is defined as mutual 
3 
discussion and arrangement of the terms of a transaction or agreement. A rep­
resentative from each of the affected divisions would meet to agree on a price to 
value the transfers between their divisions. Because the cost of these conferences 
in terms of executive time would be high, it is important that the price agreed 
on should remain in effect for a reasonably long period of time. 
3 . 
The American College Dictionary, ed. Clarence L. Barnhart 
(New York; Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1951), p. 813. 
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A negotiated transfer price differs from other types of transfer pricing 
in that it is determined by both affected divisions rather than one of the divisions 
or outside factors. The negotiations will be influenced by such factors as cost 
and market price, but the resulting transfer price is a result of their agreement 
rather than any objective factors. 
In negotiating a transfer price, bargainers occasionally will be unable 
to reach an agreement. The possibility of a deadlock gives rise to the need for a 
method of reconciliation . Arbitration by top management is not satisfactory. A 
price set by higher authority is not likely to satisfy either division manager. This 
may result in ill-feeling and dissension. A solution to this problem is suggested 
in the following discussion of a transfer pricing method proposed by Joel Dean. 
Joel Dean's proposal 
Joel Dean has proposed a negotiated pricing system which he calls com-
_ _ 4 
petitive pricing. Competitive pricing, as used by Dean, refers to pricss 
achieved through unrestricted bargaining between division managers. Require­
ments for success of his competitive pricing system are good cost and mas^cet infor­
mation, alternative sources of supply, and a well-planned implementation of the 
5 
pricing system. Dean states that his pricing system has the following advantages; 
1 . The disadvantages of published market prices, as previously dis­
cussed in this paper, are solved. 
4 
Joel Dean, pp. 65-74. 
5 
Ibid., p. 68. 
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2. An "economically correct" transfer price will insure that decisions 
increasing divisional profits will increase profits of the company. 
3. Negotiated transfer prices strengthen the independence of the 
operating divisions which makes profit evaluation more mecsning-
ful . 
4. A negotiated transfer prevents hidden losses in misdirected capital 
investments and in friction and dissension among executives that 
can be caused by a bad transfer price. 
5. Transfer prices negotiated by informed managers are sensitive to 
changes in supply and demand as reflected in competitive alter­
natives. The process of negotiation by trained executives, in 
itself, tends to avoid arbitrariness which could cause friction and 
ill-feeling. 
Once in operation, "competitive pricing" would operate smoothly, 
according to Dean . Before the new method is installed, a careful study of the 
company's market environment and how the concept of negotiated relatior»hips 
would best bit the economies of its operations should be completed. In addition, 
the qualifications of the personnel who will be negotiating transfer prices should 
be evaluated at this time. If there is a question as to their ability to arrive at 
6 
satisfactory prices, some restrictions are needed. Restrictions listed by Dean are; 
1. Pricing guides. 
6 
Ibid., p, 71 . 
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2, Temporary price limits . 
3. Limits on the volume of outside trading. 
These limitations would be temporary; they would be lifted as the negotiators 
(division managers) become more experienced. 
Top management should supervise the activities of the negotiators by 
use of a mediator. The mediator would aid negotiations by providing unbiased 
information and putting aside exaggerated or prejudiced information. Mediation 
is the most desirable means of breaking deadlocks because the final agreement 
is still in the hands of the negotiators. 
Evaluation of negotiated pricing 
As a method of estimating a market price, negotiated pricing appears 
to be reasonably satisfactory. The resulting transfer price is free from the defects 
common to market prices taken directly from imperfectly competitive markets, 
i .e., the price can not be affected by either division except over the bargain­
ing table and the price is relatively stable. Disadvantages of negotiated pricing 
may include the drain on executive time caused by negotiations and the possibil­
ity of the negotiators reaching a deadlock that mediation will not bpeak. When 
this occurs, top management will have to step in and resolve the conflict ev>en 
though the results are not likely to satisfy either party to the negotiations. 
An analysis of negotiated transfer pricing by Harold Bierman brings out 
another potential defect in negotiated pricing. This analysis indicates that 
Harold Bierman, Jr., Topics in Cost Accounting and Decisions 
(New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 76-102. 
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when either division gains control of the negotiations, it may tend to set produc­
tion levels and prices at other than optimum levels for the firm as a whole. 
8 
To simplify the analysis, Bierman makes the following assumptions: 
1 . A manufacturing division makes a product which has no inter­
mediate market, i.e., it must be sold to the distribution division. 
2 . The price of the product sold by the distribution division is set by 
purely competitive forces and the company cannot influence the 
price. The average revenue or price line is horizontal, and the 
same line would also measure the company's marginal revenues. 
Figure Number 1 shows the determination of optimum output for the 
firm. Curves MC , and MC are marginal cost curves for the distribution and 
d m ®  
manufacturing divisions respectively. Adding the marginal costs of both divi­
sions together results in the total marginal cost of the firm represented by 
curve MCj . The intersection of this total marginal cost curve with 
9 
the price line, PP, determines the optimum output of the product. At that 
level of production, marginal cost equals marginal revenue, the amount earned 
10 
by selling another unit of the firm's product. This optimum output is OQ or 
or PR. Profits are maximized at this point because production of few units would 
^Ibid., p. 93. 
'ibid., p. 94. 
^^Alfred W. Stonier and Douglas C. Hague, A Textbook of Economic 
Theory (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1961), p. 90. 
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Figure 1 — Determining optimum output 
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Figure 2 — Distribution division as monopolistic buyer 
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mean that profits could be increased by increasing output. Production of more than 
OQ units would result in the cost of each unit produced exceeding the revenues it 
brings in. 
By limiting output and sales (acting as a monQpolistlc buyer), the dis­
tribution division could maximize its own profits at the expense of the manufactur­
ing division and the firm as a whole. Thi§ situation is illustrated in Figure Number 
2 .  
Cyrve ARjj represents the average net revenue curve of the distribution 
division, assuming that transfers between the manufacturing division and the dis­
tribution division are priced at thi manufacturing division's marginal cMt. Thk 
curve (ARjj) is the difference between th© price of the end product (PP) and the 
price (MCj^ Qr P^) which would be paid to the manufacturing division. 
Curve mrj is the marginal revenue curve for the distribution division. 
To maximize its own profits, the distribution division will restrict sales to quan­
tity OS since at this point its marginal revenue (mr^j) equals marginal cost 
(MCj). Since OS is less than OQ, the profits of the firm will be decreased. The 
distribution division's profits are increased at the expense of the manufacturing 
division and the firm as a whole. 
By acting as a monopolistic seller, the manufacturing division can also 
increase its profits at the expense of the rest of the firm. In Figure Number 3, 
curve MCj, the marginal cost of the distribution division, is assumed to b& the 
minimum revenue that the distribution division will require to increase its sale of 
the product. This curve then may be labeled r^, the minimum net revenue 
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required by the distribution division. 
We can now draw the average net revenue curve for the manufacturing 
division, AR . Curve AR is the difference between the price of the end pro-' m m r r 
duct, pp, and the minimum revenue curve for the distribution division, r^. 
Curve mr^ represents the marginal revenue curve of the manufacturing division. 
The manufacturing division can be expected to produce OY units becatjse at this 
level of output its marginal revenue equals marginal costv Again, the division 
has increased its own profits at the expense of the firm as a whole since OY units 
is less than the optimum level of output for the firm, OQ. 
This,analysis indicates that negotiations to determine transfer prices 
may result in output levels which may not be desirable in terms of maximizing the 
profits of the firm. This potential weakness in negotiated pricing is an additional 
argument for supervision when this system of pricing intracompany transfers is used. 
Conclusion 
Evaluation of a decentralized operating unit should be based primarily 
on profits earned. The effect of transfer pricing on divisional profits requires that 
careful consideration be given to choosing the best transfer pricing method. The 
best transfer pricing method for a particular company will depend on the economic 
environment in which it operates. The foregoing discussions of transfer pricing 
methods indicate that no one transfer pricing method is ideal in all possible busi­
ness situations. Only by evaluating each transfer pricing method in terms of the 
objectives and environment of their company, can a company's management 
determine the best transfer pricing method for their use. Even then their 
28 
evaluation process v/ill have to include consideration of the effectiveness of the 
transfer pricing method during the period under reviev/. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRANSFER PRICING IN DECISION MAKING 
One of the basic principles of profit center decentralization is that the 
operating units should be evaluated in terms of profits. For this evaluation to be 
effective, the division manager should control most of the major determinants of 
profits. As listed in Chapter I, the division manager should have considerable 
discretion in determining operating methods, production volume, and product 
mix. Two other decision areas that v/ill affect divisional profits are pricing and 
capital budgeting. 
The division manager's authority is often restricted in the areas of 
capital budgeting and pricing. Capital budgeting decisions of large size usually 
require major financing arrangements such as the issue of additional stock or the 
sale of bonds. In addition, this type of decision will, in large part, determine 
the profitability of the firm as a whole over a number of years. Because of their 
major affect on the firm's future, capital budgeting decisions are usually subject 
to limitations when delegated to the division management. These limitations 
sometimes take the form of dollar limits on projects originated by the division 
management. 
Restrictions in the area of pricing occur for a number of reasons. It has 
already been pointed out that intracompany prices have a significant effect on 
divisional revenue and cost figures. The division manager, as a decision maker^ 
will be influenced by his division's revenue and cost figures. An unsatisfactory 
transfer price could lead to incorrect decisions by distorting this divisional data. 
This may be particularly true in the case of capital-budgeting decisions. The 
30 
effect of transfer-pricing methods on decision making in the areas of capital 
budgeting, pricing goods to outsiders, and the effect of transfer pricing on 
middle management morale will be discussed in the following sections of this 
chapter. 
Capital Budgeting Decisions 
Capital budgeting is the systematic planning and the resultant 
decision making for acquisition or construction of capital assets. Capital assets 
may be defined as long-lived facilities used in the business, such as machinery 
or buildings. A business firm has limited resources to allocate to this activity 
and, for this reason, must evaluate alternative proposals and choose those that 
are most beneficial to the firm. The decision-making process is predicated upon 
estimates of the future. Funds committed to a capital investment are recovered 
over a relatively long period of time. Consequently, capital investments are sub­
ject to an element of risk and uncertainty with regard to recovery of cost. With 
this unavoidable risk and uncertainty inherent in the basic projections, it is impor­
tant that the firm establish a procedure for arranging the information in a logical 
pattern which will facilitate selection of the most desirable investment proposals. 
When a division manager is given authority to make capital expendi­
tures, he should develop and use certain basic information. This data should 
include the following: 
1 . An evaluation of the division's economic future — Capital 
^Backer and Jacobsen, p. 543. 
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expendii-ures should be made in accordance with a plan- This 
plan should project an orderly progress toward certain objectives. 
These objectives would be determined by top management. Tbe 
division manager should evaluate these objectives in the light of 
a projection of future economic activity for the division when 
making capital expenditure decisions. 
2. The rate of obsolescence for the item to be acquired — If the 
capital item to be acquired will be obsolete in a very short time, 
its earnings potential must be proportionately higher to justify the 
investment. 
3. The future earnings increase resulting from the expenditures — 
Investment in capital assets should result in increased earnings. 
An evaluation of the proposed capital expenditure's contribution 
to divisional profits throughout its life is a significant measure of 
its v/orth to the division. 
4. The initial cost of the capital asset — The initial cost includes 
purchase price, transportation costs^ and any costs incurred in put­
ting the capital asset into operating condition. This combination 
of costs reveals the immediate outlay of cash or debt necessary to 
receive the future increase in revenue estimated in Item 3 above. 
A number of systems have been devised to formulate the analysis of the 
above information. The methods which provide the bes^t results estimate the present 
value or current worth of the capital investment's future earnings. By comparing 
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this amount with the outlay necessary to acquire the capital asset, the return on 
the investment may be determined. Investment decisions based on the comparison 
of the returns the various proposals will earn on their required investment should 
result in the best capital investments. 
Some of the methods that have been developed to estimate or evaluate 
2 
the current worth of a capital investment's contributions to future earnings are; 
1 . The discounted cash flow method --*^n interest rate is calculated 
which will discount the expected future cash flow from the invest­
ment back to the present value of the investment. Comparison of 
the interest rate on different proposals will indicate which propo­
sals are the most desirable . 
2. The excess-present-value method — Estimated cash income from 
the investment is discounted at an established interest rate. The 
interest rate will vary according to the risk involved, but should 
be higher than the cost of capital to the firm. The present value 
of the projected cash flows must exceed the present value of the 
proposed investment in order for the investment to be worth con­
sideration. Sn evaluating alternative proposals, the investment 
with the largest excess of present value of future cash flows over 
present value of the investment would be considered the best 
investment. 
3. The Terborgh, or MAPI, method — By use of a prepared graph. 
^Ibid., pp. 564-570. 
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the timing of replacements is evaluated under this method. The 
economic desirability of replacement is determined by comparing 
the cost of keeping the present facility with the cost of buying 
the new facility on a time-adjusted basis. 
In all of the above methods, future projections play an important role-
These projects are undoubtedly affected by historical revenue and cost data. 
Any distortion of divisional cost or revenue data by unfair or misleading transfer 
prices may result in erroneous projections and thereby cause incorrect capital 
budgeting decisions. 
The transfer-pricing method used does not matter as long as the capital 
budgeting procedure takes into account the effect of the transfer pricing method 
in use on the projections used to evaluate capital investment proposals. A 
market-based transfer price will tend to put the division in the position of an 
independent company while a cost transfer price will tend to give a better 
picture of the costs of the firm as a whole . 
If a market-based transfer price or a negotiated price is used, the capital-
budgeting analysis will tend to indicate the most desirable investment for the divi­
sion as an independent entity. Because of the imperfections in intracompany pric­
ing methods noted in Chapter 11 I, this may not be the most desirable investment 
for the firm as a whole. For example, if the transfer price is taken from an imper­
fectly competitive market without modification and the selling division is manipula­
ting the supply of goods in the market to keep prices high, projections of revenues 
to be added by a proposed capital investment for the selling division may indicate 
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that an investment is desirable when it is really not so. 
To reduce the possibility of undesirable capital investment decisions, it 
is necessary to restrict the division manager's authority in this area. In order to 
retain the maximum degree of decentralization, this restriction is often in the 
form of a dollar limit. Only when investment decisions Income large enough to 
have a serious effect on the company as a whole is it necessary to restrict the 
delegation of authority to the division manager. 
Return on investment 
Capital assets (plant and equipment) also have>a major effect on another 
aspect of decentralization. When the return earned on the company's investment 
in the division is used to evaluate the division's performance, decisions regarding 
methods of computing just what the company's investment in the division is, 
become very important. 
The return-on-investment computation, an evaluation tool, is discussed 
here rather than in Chapter 1 !l because of its close relation to capital assets and 
capital budgeting decisions. Because of the current popularity of the return on 
investment as a method of evaluating profit centers, considerable effort will be 
made to point out its weaknesses as well as its advantages. 
Return on investment is the net profit divided by the average invest-
3 
ment. The net profit is subject to the effects of transfer pricing methods as 
discussed in Chapter Mi. If the profit figure is distorted by an unsatisfactory 
^jbid., p. 436. 
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transfer price, the return on investment will also be distorted. Evaluation based 
on the return on investment does not lessen the importance of a reliable transfer 
price. 
The investment base in the computation presents an additional problem 
in this type ©f evaluation. Three determinations of significance are 1) which 
assets should be included in the investment base; 2) allocation of asset invest­
ment to plants, divisions, product lines, or other internal sectors; and 3) 
valuation of the investment base. 
The assets included in the investment base for computation of the 
return on investment should be only those assets directly related to the produc­
tion of income. Earnings from general business assets such as investments are 
not included in a division's profits, and these investments should be excluded 
from the division's investment base. 
Allocation of indirect assets such as central office cash and research 
and development facilities should be apportioned on some logical basis-such as 
the division's use of the asset or facility. As in the case of allocating the 
expenses of service units, it may be best to exclude such areas of the firm from 
the evaluation of the operating units. 
Valuation of the investment base refers to the question of whether 
capital assets should be included in the investment base at acquisition-cost, book 
value (acquisition cost less accumulated depreciation), or some approximation of 
current economic value. Current economic value is often computed by reducing 
the asset's replacement value by accumulated depreciation. The accumulated 
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depreciation would be determined by applying the assefs established ctepreciation 
rat& to the replacement value for the number of years the asset has been in use. 
John Deardon illustrates the importance of considering valuation 
bases when using return on investment to evaluate profit centers. He states that 
the combination of valuation methods and depreciation methods will determine 
the effectiveness of return on investment as a guide to decision making and 
4 
evaluations regarding profit centers. A summary of his analysis of the four com­
mon combinations follows. 
Gross book value and composite depreciation 
The combination of gross book value and composite depreciation is the 
least desirable when the return on investment is to be used for investment decision 
making and evaluation. Gross book value is the acquisition cost of the facilities 
(plant and equipment) while composite depreciation is a method whereby fixed 
assets are grouped together and depreciation Is taken by applying a rate based 
on an estimated average life for the whole group. An asset is assumed to be 
fully depreciated when it is retired under the composite method. The weakness 
of the combination can be shown by considering two investment situations. 
First of all, the operating unit manager is encouraged to dispose of 
idle equipment regardless of its potential use. This is because idle facilities tend 
to reduce his return on investment. The cost of such assets are included in the 
investment base, and depreciation on this cost reduces the operating unit's net 
^John Dearden, "Problem in Decentralized Profit Responsibility," 
Harvard Business Review, XXXVH I (May-June, 1960), pp. 79-86. 
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profit. By disposing of the asset, the division manager can reduce his invest­
ment base and increase profits. 
For example, if the idle facilities cost $50,000 and are subj^t to a 
depreciation rate of 10%, the effect of their disposal can be illustrated as follows: 
Decrease in investment base 
Total assets prior to retirement $250,000 
Less cost of asset retired 50,000 
Total assets after retirement $200,000 
Increase in profits 
Net profit — depreciation on idle 
facilities included $ 25,000 
Add back depreciation on idle 
facilities 5,000 
Net profit — idle facilities retired $ 30,000 
Return on investment 
Idle facilities not retired 
Net profit 25,000 _ 
Total assets 250,000 
Idle facilities retired 
Net profit 30,000 -
Total assets 200,000 
The increase in the return on investment available through the retirement of idle 
facilities makes no allowance for potential future use of the equipment and it may 
encourage retirement of potentially useful facilities. 
Secondly, the combination of gross book value and composite depreci­
ation may impair the timing of investments in more efficient facilities. The timing 
of investments of this type should be based on the cost of keeping the old asset as 
5 
compared with the cost of acquiring the replacement. When gross book value is 
Backer and Jacobsen, p. 545. 
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combined with composite depreciation, the division's investment base is changed 
only by the difference between the cost of the asset to be replaced and the cost 
of its more efficient replacement. This may lead the division manager to base his 
evaluation on the change in his investment base rather than the costs involved. 
For example, assume that a machine costing $120,000 can increase 
future earnings by approximately $20,000 a year over a ten-year useful life. The 
machine it would replace has a similar useful life and cost $100,000. The combi­
nation of gross book value and composite depreciation encourages the division 
manager to make an analysis similar to the following; 
Increase in investment base 
Cost added (new machine) $120,000 
Cost deducted (old machine) 100,000 
$ 20,000 
Increase in earnings 
Increase in earnings from new machine $ 20,000 
Less; increase in depreciation 
Depreciation — 
new machine $12,000 
Depreciation — 
old machine $ 10,000 2,000 
$18, 000 
Return on investment 
= 90% 
20,000 
This relatively high rate of return might encourage the division manager to make 
the replacement. But what effect will the investment have on the return on invest­
ment earned by the company as a whole? The following analysis is the "account­
ing" method of evaluation investments in capital assets. 
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Cash outlay for new machine $120,000 
Return 
Increase in earning^ $20,000 
Less: annual 
depreciation 12,000 $ 8,000 
Return on investment 
—= 6.7% 
120,000 
This much lower result emphasizes how misleading the analysis encouraged by the 
combination of gross book value and composite depreciation con be. 
Gross book value and unit depreciation 
The combination of gross book value and unit depreciation is an improve­
ment over the prior example. Depreciation computed separately on each facility 
is called unit depreciation. While the investment base for the return on invest­
ment computation is still valued at gross book value (cost), recording retire­
ments under unit depreciation means a loss must be recognized when partially 
depreciated idle facilities are retired. As an example, suppose a machine cost­
ing $100,000 with accumulated depreciation of $50P00is scrapped. Assuming 
that the cost of scrapping equals the machine's salvage value, composite depre­
ciation would result in recognition of no gain or loss. The asset would be pre­
sumed to be, fully depreciated and $100,000 would be removed from both the 
group asset account and the accumulated depreciation for the group. If unit 
depreciation is used, the machine and its related accumulated depreciation are 
maintained in separate accounts. A loss of $50,000 will be recognized on the 
disposal. When assets are retired, a loss will be recognized if it is not fully 
depreciated. 
The incentive to dispose of idle facilities which exists under composite 
depreciation is removed by using unit depreciation. Any loss on retirement of 
idle facilities would have to be recognized. However, when facilities are 
almost fully depreciated, the problem arises again. The asset can then be 
retired with little recognized loss, and the investment base for the retum-on-
investment computation is reduced without adverse affect on profits. 
Net book value and unit depreciation 
A more satisfactory combination includes net book value and unit 
depreciation. Net book value is gross book value reduced by accumulated depre­
ciation. The incentive to scrap idle facilities, fully depreciated or not, is 
removed. Because the investment base includes cost less accumulated depreci­
ation, no reduction in investment results from the retirement of fully depreciated 
assets. The investment base can be reduced by retirimg partially depreciated 
assets, but the incentive to do so is reduced by the fact that a loss equal to the 
reduction in investment base must be recognized because unit depreciation is 
used. As previously illustrated, unit depreciation requires separate recognition 
of gain or loss on disposal of a capital asset. The amount of the loss is the dif­
ference between the cost of the asset and the accumulated depreciation v*4^ich 
equals the net book value. 
In both of the last two combinations, consideration of book loss was 
a major factor in removing the incentive to retire idle facilities. However, 
6 
book loss should not be considered when making investment decisions. The 
^jbid., p. 546 
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example of a simple rate of return analysis noted previously illustrates the impor­
tance of considering the future. Past expenditures are sunk costs. They cannot 
be recovered, and they should not affect the evaluation of future expenditures. 
Net book value and composite depreciation 
Combining net book value with composite depreciation eliminates the 
disadvantages previously mentioned. Book losses no longer affect investment 
decisions because the assets are considered fully depreciated when retired. 
Jletirement of an idle machine will reduce the group asset account and the 
accumulated deprecation by the same amount because it is assumed to be fully 
depreciated when composite depreciation is used. Because the asset account and 
the accumulated depreciation are reduced by the same amount, net book value 
(cost less accumulated depreciation for the group) is not changed. 
The only remaining problem is the reduction in depreciation expense 
a retirement may offer. This problem can be solved by using declining balance 
depreciation. Declining-balance depreciation differs from other depreciation 
methods in that the depreciation rate is applied to the net book vakie rather 
than gross book value. A plant with an original cost of $100,000 and accumu­
lated depreciation of $50,000, subject to a 10% depreciation rate, would have 
on annual depreciation of $10,000 ($100,000 x 10%) under ordinary 
(straight-line) depreciation methods. When declining-balance ctepreciation is 
used, the depreciation for the current year would be $5,000 (original cost less 
W. Stanley Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy (London: 
MacMillan andCo., 1924), p. 164. 
accumulated depreciation times the depreciation rate) No decrease in deprecia­
tion would result from a retirement because net book value (original cost less 
accumulated depreciation) is not changed by a retirement when composite depre­
ciation is used. !n the above example, the retirement of a $10,000 idle machine 
would reduce depreciation to $9,000 ($90,000 X 110%) under ordinary methods 
but does not change the depreciation when declining-balance depreciation is 
used ($90,000 - $40,000 = $50,000; $50,000 X10% - $5,000). 
The combination of net book value and composite-declining-balance 
depreciation appears to insure a community of interests between the division and 
the company for investment decisions. However, there is a disadvantage to the 
use of a return-on-investment evaluation we have not considered. A division 
with a relatively high proportion of plant and equipment purchased prior to 
1945 will tend to have a high rate of return due to a low investment base rather 
than good performance. Because of the inflation that has occurred since World 
War 1 1, the original cost of assets purchased before that time is often consider­
ably below replacement cost. Their net book value will be low because of 
large amounts of accumulated depreciation. 
Comparing a division with a high proportion of these low-valued 
assets to one that has a high proportion of new higher-valued assets would not be 
very meaningful. It would be very difficult to segregate the effect of asset ages 
from the effect of earnings and efficient performance. Also, a high rate of return 
on investment caused by low-valued assets will tend to discourage division manage­
ment when considering replacements which would increase their investment base. 
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An example would occur when an asset which will earn the division a return of 
say 8% is turned down because the division's current rate of return is higher when 
this higher rate is due to a low investment base. 
Deardon's proposal 
Deardon has proposed a system which solves the problems described 
above by using a valuation procedure distinct and separate from book valjues for 
8 
rate-of-return computations. The principal feotures of this system are as follows: 
1 . The facilities assigned to a division are valued at their current 
economic (market) value. 
2. Once established, the divisional investment is reduced periodi­
cally by depreciation on a composite basis using th& declining-
balance method. 
3. Because composite-declining-balance depreciation is used, 
there is no reduction in either investment or depreciation. 
expense when an asset is retired. 
4. All additions to facilities, after the initial evaluations h@ve 
been made, are valued at cost. 
5 . Asset values may be changed when conditions warrantj, such as 
when price levels change significantly or when a new manager 
is assigned to the division and it is necessary to erase the mis­
takes of the prior manager. 
8 
Deardon, p. 84. 
44 
The advantages of Dearden's proposal over book value as an investment 
9 
basis for a return-on-investment evaluation are given by him as follows; 
1 . The investment base of the division will motivate division managers 
to act in the best interests of the company when replacing or 
retiring facilities. 
2. Divisional rates of return on invested capital will not be dis­
torted by abnormally low asset values, 
3. The division is provided with a more realistic basis for pricing 
and costing its products. 
4. Top management has a more useful tool for evaluating divisional 
management in that comparisons between divisions are more mean­
ingful and the mistakes of a replaced manager can be erased by 
adjusting values, thus relieving the new manager from the burden 
of his predecessor's mistakes. 
The separation of regular accounting records from data to be used for 
evaluation of a profit center has considerable merit. Many of the problems that 
arise in attempting to establish satisfactory controls over decentralized profit 
centers result from the failure of ordinary accounting data to establish a commu­
nity of interests between the company and the profit center. 
Dissension 
Many companies compensate division managers on a profit-sharing 
basis. This is done to encourage their interest in the division's profits. The 
implication of such a profit-sharing plan is that the division manager controls 
9 
Ibid., p. 85 
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the factors determining profits and will be motivated to increase profite if his per­
sonal income v/ill be increased by his actions. However, arbitrarily imposed trans­
fer prices and allocation of central office costs are factors affecting divisional 
profits determined by top management. If the division manager feels that these 
factors are unfair, dissension and ill-feeling can result. 
The allocation of central office costs can be equitable if they are 
charged to the division as the services of the central office are actually used. 
However, it is often difficult to determine how much of a particular service the 
division uses. - For example, the president of a company would probably spend 
most of his time supervising and planning for the company as a whole, and there 
is not likely to be any objective way of allocating his salary to the division. 
To avoid this problem, the profit figure used for evaluation of the division and 
for determining the division manager's compensation should be divisional profits 
before allocation of central office costs. 
Internal dissension may be caused by an arbitrary transfer price. To 
avoid dissension, the division manager must feel that the transfer price is fair. 
A fair transfer price should approximate the price the division manager could 
receive outside the company. As indicated in Chapter 11 1, market-based and 
negotiated transfer prices should approximate this goal. 
Decentralization often represents a radical departure from prior manage­
ment practice. Because decentralization is often a major change, it tends to 
unsettle division management. A certain amount of uneasiness can occur even when 
a satisfactory transfer pricing method is used and central office costs are excluded 
from divisional profit statements. To minimize any resistance to decentralization, 
education and pre-selling of this philosophy is necessary. This will help prepare 
divisional management for the additional responsibilities decentralization places 
on them. These efforts may also smooth the transition to decentralization» 
Pricing Products Sold Outside the Company 
Information necessary to price products should be provided to divi­
sions selling outside the company. The necessary information includes current 
levels of output, production capacity, marginal cost, total cost to produce, and 
market data. Tb« transfer-pricing method used should provide cost data from 
, other processing divisions. None of the transfer-pricing methods automatically 
provides all of the necessary cost information. The more desirable pricing methods 
for evaluating divisional performance, market-based and negotiated pricing, 
actually conceal all cost data from other divisions contributing to the product. 
To provide the desired cost and production information, it must be accu­
mulated and passed on by each division contributing to the product. This informa­
tion can be accumulated by using a procedyre suggested by Paul Cook. He sug­
gests the use of a voucher to accompany intracompany transfers. This voucher 
would detail the transfer price, accumulated variable costs (to approximate mar­
ginal cost), and overhead added by preceding divisions. Cook's proposal does not 
include level of output and production capacity for each division, but this infor­
mation could easily be added to the voucher. 
Paul Cook, "New Technique for Intracompany Pricing," Harvard 
Business Review, XXXV (July-August, 1957), p. 78. 
CHAPTER V 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND SUMMARY 
It has been suggested that the recent developments in information tech­
nology would reverse the trend toward decentralization that has existed since World 
War 11. ^ The combination of high speed computers and sophisticated methods of 
quantitative analysis have greatly increased the quality of information available 
to top management. With this improved information available to top managment, 
the need for decentralization to bring management decision levels closer to the 
transactions is reduced. A wealth of data relevant to a particular decision can 
now be made available to top management. 
This opinion on the effects of information technological improvements 
ignores two factors. First, there are some types of decisions which are not sub­
ject to quantification. These are, in the words of John BuHingame, . .the 
decisions involving human beings and intangible subjective human values; the 
balancing of social, morale, and economic values; and the assessment of situa­
tions in which information needs cannot be adequately anticipated or adequately 
2 
filled." Secondly, the advantages of delegating psofit responsibility, as noted 
in Chapter 1, go beyond the lowering of the day-to-day decision-making level. 
Of particular importance is the development of the middle managers. 
^John F. Burlingame, "Information Techno logy and Decentralization," 
Harvard Business Review, XXXIX (November-December, 1961,)p. 121. 
^Ibid., p. 122. 
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Burlingame suggests that improvements in information technology will 
3 
reinforce the trend to decentralization. One of the most significant problems 
in a decentralized firm is the need for quality information at the middle-manage­
ment level. The problems in pricing products at the time they are sold outside 
the company is a good example of how important good information can be at the 
division-management level. Division managers Reed to -have access to data that 
will clearly show the contribution of their division to the firm as a whole. This 
knowledge would be particularly significant if it increases unders^nd an^reduces 
dissension between division managers and top management. 
Summary 
importance of planning 
The decentralization of a large going concern should not be taken 
lightly. The profound changes in management philosophy and individual respon­
sibilities cannot help but cause a certain amount of uncertainty and unhappiness 
among existing management personnel. Every effort should be made to minimize 
these morale problems. Education of divisional management and planning to avoid 
unfair transfer pricing and allocation of costs to profit centers are important steps 
which will help reduce these morale problems. Division management education 
on decentralization should include a detailed description of how decentralization 
works, its philosophy, and what will be expected of them. Planning for decentra­
lization essentially requires the development of a controlled delegation of authority. 
3 
Ibid., p. 124. 
When profit centers are used to control this delegation of authority, the company 
must be divided into operating units and an effective system of profit evaluation 
must be developed. This evaluation method must be fair to the personnel being 
evaluated as well as serving as an effective management tool. 
Selection of a transfer pricing method 
During the planning for decentralization, the transfer-pricing method 
should be determined. The method used should depend on the company's objec­
tives in decentralization and the external data available. If intracompany trans­
fers will be a significant determinant of operating unit profits, decentralization 
of profit responsibility will require the consideration of only two pricing methods. 
Negotiated prices and competitive market prices are the two alternatives that 
give prospect to satisfactory profit-based evaluations. 
The advantages and disadvantages of both market and negotiated prices 
should be considered in the light of the company's particular situation. Where 
I 
competitive intermediate markets exist, it is not to the firm's advantage to use 
4 
anything but the market price. While prior discussion indicated that negotiated 
pricing is less desirable, it may be the best alternative if no perfectly competitive 
market price exists. Most firms will probably find themselves somewhere between 
these two extremes. The more advantageous method for them will depend on the 
factors mentioned in the respective discussions of negotiated and market-based 
transfer pricing applied to the firm's environment. 
___ _ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ __ ^ ^ ^ _________ 
Harold Bierman, Jr., Topics in Cost Accounting and Decisions 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), p. 90. 
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Conclusion 
The importance of the transfer pricing problem li«s in its effect on the 
profit evaluation of operating unsts in a decentralized company. The difficulties 
involved in adequately solving the transfer pricing problem place some qualifica­
tions on such profit evaluations. The following statement by- Harold Bierman is 
5 
particularly pertinent» "At its best, accounting information is raw material, 
which to be useful to management must be processed. Without analysis, any 
intracompany pricing scheme may lead to faulty information and decisions." 
In addition, profit evaluation should not be relied on to the exclusion 
of other measures of performance. As noted in Chapter 1, objectives other than 
short-term profits such as personnel development, planning activities, labor 
relations and civic responsibility should be considered. These other objectives 
are important determinants of long-run profitability which is the real goal of a 
profit-motivated business. 
^ibid ., p. 90 . 
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  
Books 
Allen, Louis A. Management and Organization. New Yorks McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1958. 
Backer^ Morton, and Jacobsen, Lyle E. Cost Accounting; A Management 
Approach. New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964. ~ 
Bierman, Harold, Jr. Topics in Cost Accounting and Decisions. New York; 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963. — 
Cordiner, Ralph J. New Frontiers for Professional Managers. New York; 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956. 
Koontz, Harold, and O'Donnell, Cyril. Principles of Management. 
New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964. 
Lewis, Ronello B Financial Analysis for Management. Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1959. 
National Association of Cost Accountants. N . A . C . A .  Y e a r  B o o k ;  1 9 2 5 .  
.  N . A o C - A .  Y e a r  B o o k ;  1 9 3 0 . 
. Accounting for intracompany Transfers (Research Series No. 30). 
New York; National Association of Cost Accountants, 1956. 
Paton, William A., and Paton, William A., Jr. Corporation Accounts and 
Statements. New York; The MacMillan Company, 1955. 
Pfiffner, John M., and Sherwood, Frank P. Administrative Organization. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice Hall, Inc., 1960. 
Shillinglaw, Gordon. Cost Accounting - Analysis and Control. Homewood, 
Illinois; Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1961. 
52 
Articles and Periodicals 
Benson, R. A. "Pricing jnterplant Transfers for Measuring Plant Operations," 
National Association of Accountants Bulletin, XLIV (February, 1963), 
pp. 53-57 
Bierman, Harold J. "Pricing Intracompany Transfers, " The Accounting Review, 
XXXIV (July, 1959), pp. 429-432. 
Bowman, K. J. "Divisional Contribution, Product Margin and etc. 
Reporting," National Association of Accountants Bulletin, 
XLIV (February, 1963), pp. 47-51 . 
Burlingame, J. F. "Information Technology and Decentralization, " 
Harvard Business Review, XXXIX (November-December, 1961), 
pp. 121-126. 
\ / 
Boyd, R. W. "Transfer Prices and Profitability Measurement, " The 
Controller, XXIX (February, 1961), pp. 55-66. 
Cook, Paul W., Jr. "Decentralization and the Transfer Price Problem," 
The Journal of Business, XXVI11 (April, 1955), pp. 87-94. 
. "New Technique for Intracompany Pricing," Harvard Business 
Review, XXXV (July-August, 1957), pp. 74-80. 
Deardon, John. "Interdivisional Pricing," Harvard Business Review, 
X X X V I 1  1  ( J a n u a r y - F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 6 0 ) ^  p p .  1 1 7 - 1 2 5 .  
. "Problems in Decentralized Profit Responsibility" Harvard 
Business Review, XXXVI11 (May-June, I960), pp. 79-86. 
. "Problem in Decentralized Financial Control," Harvard 
Business Review, XXXIX (May-June, 1961), pp. 72-80. 
. "Limits on Decentralized Profit Responsibility,^" Harvard 
Business Review, XL (July-August, 1962), pp. 81-89. 
"Mirage of Profit Decentralization," Harvard Business Review, 
XL (November-December, 1962), pp. 140-143. 
Dean, Joel. "Decentralization and Intracompany Pricing, " Harvard 
Business Review, XXXI 11 (July-August, 1955), pp. 65-74. 
53 
Dean, Joel. "Profit Performance Measurement of Division Managers," 
The Controller, XXXV (September, 1957), pp. 423-424, 426, 449, 
"Approach to Internal Profit Measurement," National Association of 
Accountants Bulletin, XXXIX (March, 1958)^ pp. 5-12» ~ ~ 
Drebin, Allen R. "Proposal for Dual Pacing of Intracompany Transfers, " 
National Association of Accountants Bulletin, XL (February, 1959), 
pp. 51-55. 
Edson, Harvey O. "Return on investment as a Measure of Management 
Efficiency," The Controller, XXV (June, 1957), pp. 271-273,297. 
Evans, M. K. "Accounting Problems in Measuring Performance by Organizational 
Units," National Association of Cost Accountants Bulletin^ XXXVI 
(August, 1955), pp. 1739-1748. ~ 
GiHis, J. L. "When is a Corporation Properly Decentralized?" Commercial 
and Financial Chronical, XLIV (October 2, 1962), p. 1413. 
Greer, H. C. "Divisional Profit Calculation, " National Association ©f 
Accountants Bulletin, XLiSl (July^ 1962), pp . 5-12. 
Heuser, Forrest L. "Organizing for Effective Intracompany Pricing," 
National Association of Cost Accountants Bulletin, XXXVI1 i 
(May, 1956), pp. 1100-1105. 
Hirshleifer, Jack. "On the Economics of Transfer Pricing," -The Journal of 
Business, XXIX (July, 1956), pp. 172-184o 
. "Economics of the Decentralized Firm", The Journal of Buaness, 
~ " XXX (July, 1957), pp. 96-108. — — 
"Letting Divisions Run Themselves at McGraw-Edison, " Business Week^ 
December 19, 1959, p. 126. 
Likert, Rensis. "Measuring Organizational Performance," Harvard Business 
Review, XXXVI (March-April, 1958), pp. 41-50. 
"Management Ways of General Electric, " Duns Review and Modern industry, 
LXXXII (November, 1963), pp. 28-30, 
"Managing the Decentralized Company," The Management Record, XXV ^ 
(January, 1963), pp. 8-28. 
A 
54 
McLain, Robert K. "Transfer Pricing Can Contribute to Divisional Performance ^ 
Evaluation," National Association of Accountants Bulletin,. XLIV 
(August, 1963), pp. 29-32. 
Moberg, H. W. "Principle of Control for Decentralized Operations," National 
Association of Accountants Bulletin, XLS 11 (July, 1962), pp. 43-56, 
Murphy, Robert W. "Corporate Divisions vs. Subsidiaries," Harvard Business 
Reviev/, XXXIV (November-December, 1956), pp. 83-92. ~ 
Annual Conference Proceedings, National Association of Cost Accountants 
Bulletin, XXXVI (September, 1955), pp. 124'"125. 
Rickard, E. B. "A Study in Decentralization; Control I ership in a Decentralized 
Organization," National Association of Cost Accountants Bulletin, 
XXXI! (January, 1950), pp^ 567-578. ~ ~ 
Seed, A. H. "Decentralized Accounting to Divisions, " National Association of 
Cost Accountants Bulletin, XXXV! (August, 1955), pp. 1698-1704. 
Seybold, Roscoe. "Some Aspects of Inter-Unit Accounting Methods," National 
Association of Cost Accountants Bulletin, XVill (October, 1935), 
pp. 161-174. ~ ~ 
Shillinglaw, Gordon. "Guides to Internal Profit Measurement," Harvard Business 
Review, XXXV (March-April, 1957), pp. 82-91. 
Stone, Williard E. "intracompany Pricing," The Accounting Review, XXXI 
(October, 1956), pp. 625-627. 
. "Tax Consideration in intracompany Pricing," The Accounting Review, 
^ XXXV (January, 1960), pp. 45-50. —— -
Svenson, A. L. "Case for Decentralization, " Advanced AAanagement, XXVI 
(February, 1961), pp. 14-15. , —— 
Villers, Raymond. "Control and Freedom in a Decentralized Company," Harvard 
Business Review, XXXI! (March-April, 1954), pp. 89-96. 
Williams, L. S. "Pricing of Products Sold Between Divisions/' Controllership; 
Trends and Techniques, Controllers Institute of. America, 1953, 
pp. 110-115. 
Wright, John W. D. "Setting Earnings Standards for Decentralized Operations", 
The Controller, XXV (February, 1957), pp. 59-62. 
